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98 N.C. L. REV. 1043 (2020)

CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS IN COURT*
AMANDEEP S. GREWAL**
The ongoing political battles between President Donald J. Trump and House Democrats
have sparked substantial debates over the legislature’s authority to oversee the executive
branch. The House has not been discouraged by Trump Administration resistance and
has conducted several headline-making investigations. The judiciary has also been
pulled into the fray through various lawsuits seeking to enforce House-issued subpoenas.
Yet courts cannot address the validity of those subpoenas until they address a threshold
question: Does Congress have standing to judicially enforce a subpoena against the
executive branch? The Supreme Court has never held that Congress, its houses, or its
members enjoy standing to sue the executive branch, whether through a subpoena or
otherwise. Raines v. Byrd rebuffs most congressional lawsuits initiated by individual
legislators, but the Court has not formally rejected lawsuits initiated by the House or
Senate. For those, the Court has vaguely warned that separation of powers problems
would arise, saying little else. This Article wrestles with the complex standing issues that
arise when the legislature sues the Executive. It shows that under one key conceptual
approach—and possibly the one that the Supreme Court will adopt—Congress can
never sue the executive branch to enforce a subpoena.
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INTRODUCTION
The ongoing political battles between President Donald J. Trump and the
House of Representatives have sparked substantial debates over the legislature’s
authority to oversee the executive branch and ferret out wrongdoing. The
House has not been discouraged by the Trump Administration’s resistance and
has conducted several headline-making investigations.1 The judiciary has been
pulled into this fray through various lawsuits seeking to enforce House-issued
subpoenas.2 But courts cannot address the validity of those subpoenas until they
address a threshold question: Does Congress have standing to judicially enforce
a subpoena against the executive branch?
The Supreme Court has never held that Congress, its houses, or its
members enjoy standing to sue the executive branch, whether over a subpoena
or otherwise.3 In Raines v. Byrd,4 the Court held that individual congressional
members themselves suffered no “injury-in-fact,” as contemplated by the
Article III case-or-controversy requirement,5 when their institutions had
allegedly been harmed.6 The Court left open whether institutional injuries
alleged by the House or Senate would be judicially cognizable.7 Thus, whether
the House or Senate enjoys standing to sue over the executive branch’s defiance
of a subpoena remains an unresolved question.

1. See Matthew Callahan & Reuben Fischer-Baum, Where the Trump Administration Is Thwarting
House Oversight, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
graphics/2019/politics/trump-blocking-congress/ [https://perma.cc/QN2G-9YGA (dark archive)]
(tracking the progress of about twenty different oversight battles between the House and the Trump
Administration).
2. See id.; see also Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 516–22 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(involving subpoena to compel testimony from former White House official), reh’g en banc granted sub
nom. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, No. 19-1576, 2020 WL 1228477 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en
banc); Comm. on Oversight v. Barr, No. 1:19-cv-03557 (D.D.C. 2019) (involving subpoena for censusrelated information); Comm. on Ways & Means v. Dep’t. of Treasury, No. 1:19-CC-01974 (D.D.C.
filed July 2, 2019) (involving subpoena for President Trump’s tax return information); Cummings v.
Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 107–08 (D.D.C. 2018) (involving demand made under 5 U.S.C. § 2954
for information held by the General Services Administration related to its dealings with the Trump
Hotel).
3. Aside from subpoena lawsuits, the House and its members have filed lawsuits related to
border wall construction and the Foreign Emoluments Clause. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Trump, 949
F.3d 14 passim (D.C. Cir. 2020) (denying standing to group of various Representatives and Senators
for claims related to the Foreign Emoluments Clause); U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin,
379 F. Supp. 3d 8 passim (D.D.C. 2019) (denying congressional standing to pursue claims related to
border wall construction), en banc review granted, No. 19-1576, 2020 WL 1228477 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en
banc) (explaining that the D.C. Circuit’s internal procedures allow “en banc consideration prior to the
[initial] panel decision”).
4. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
5. See infra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
6. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829–30; see also Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945,
1953 (2019) (“[I]ndividual members lack standing to assert the institutional interests of a legislature.”).
7. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829–30.
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This Article, prepared for the North Carolina Law Review symposium,
Legal Ethics in the Age of Trump,8 shows how the “public trust approach” would
deny standing to congressionally initiated subpoena lawsuits.9 As Part I
explains, the public trust approach emphasizes that legislators and legislative
bodies exercise authority only in representational capacities, as trustees for their
constituents. Thus, any harm they suffer in those capacities cannot be
“personal”10 as required by injury-in-fact analysis.11
Part II applies the public trust approach to congressional subpoena
disputes. It concludes that, under the public trust approach, neither Congress
nor its individual houses enjoy standing to judicially enforce subpoenas against
the executive branch.12 This part also shows how arguments used to support
congressional standing in prior subpoena disputes do not undermine the
principles behind the public trust approach.
Part III explores what the Court might do if a congressional subpoena
dispute reaches it. Case law established after Raines severely muddies the issues,
8. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Introduction: Legal Ethics in the Age of Trump, 98 N.C. L.
REV. 1029 (2020); F. Andrew Hessick, Defending the Constitutionality of Federal Statutes, 98 N.C. L.
REV. 1185 (2020); Nancy B. Rapoport, Training Law Students To Maintain Civility in Their Law Practices
as a Way to Improve Public Discourse, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1143 (2020); Rebecca Roiphe, A Typology of Justice
Department Lawyer’s Roles and Responsibilities, 98 N.C. L. REV. 1077 (2020).
9. See infra Part I.
10. An injury in fact generally arises when the plaintiff has suffered “an invasion of a legally
protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized,” rather than one that is “conjectural or
hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). To be particularized, “the injury must affect
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 560 n.1 (emphasis added).
11. The Court has recognized that legislators may suffer personal injuries in limited contexts. See
Raines, 521 U.S. at 821 (describing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969), which involved a
legislator who had been excluded from the House of Representatives and who suffered a loss of salary,
as a case in which the plaintiff asserted his claim in a “private capacity” over something to which he
was “personally . . . entitled”); see also Tara Leigh Grove, Government Standing and the Fallacy of
Institutional Injury, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 611, 651–58 (2019) [hereinafter Grove, Standing and Fallacy]
(analyzing the Court’s inscrutable decision in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), involving votenullification claims brought by state legislators). These unusual circumstances do not bear on
interbranch subpoena disputes because congressional investigatory power is vested in the House or the
Senate as a whole, rather than in individual members. See, e.g., Reed v. Cty. Comm’rs, 277 U.S. 376,
388–89 (1928) (acknowledging the Senate’s investigatory powers but concluding that individual
Senators, who formed a special committee, could not sue to enforce that power when not authorized
by the chamber).
12. Standing doctrine includes multiple elements. See infra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
But this Article will, for ease of exposition, assume that a plaintiff that satisfies the injury-in-fact
requirement has standing to sue. Also, this Article does not deal with other potential barriers to
congressional lawsuits, such as whether a statutory cause of action must exist for the House or Senate
to sue the executive branch or whether courts must receive a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to
hear interbranch disputes. District courts have previously resolved those issues in favor of Congress.
See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17–20 (D.D.C. 2013)
(concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides subject matter jurisdiction for congressionally initiated
subpoena lawsuits); Comm. on Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 80–85 (D.D.C. 2008)
(concluding that cause of action exists for congressionally initiated subpoena lawsuits).
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and it is impossible to determine the conceptual approach the Court will use.
The Court must wrestle with inconsistencies whether it adopts the public trust
approach or another approach. But the public trust approach fits best with
broader structural principles embraced by the Constitution. The Court should
thus adopt it.
I. CONGRESSIONAL LAWSUITS AND ARTICLE III REQUIREMENTS
This part explains how courts have applied standing doctrine to
interbranch lawsuits. Section I.A shows how the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit exercised its jurisdiction over those
suits and how dissenting judges on that court established the public trust
approach. Section I.B shows that the Supreme Court has partially followed the
public trust approach but has left open key questions related to interbranch
lawsuits.
A.

Development of the Public Trust Approach

Under the Constitution, the judiciary enjoys limited authority in our
government. Article III specifies that federal courts enjoy the “judicial power
of the United States,” which generally extends only to specified “cases” and
“controversies.”13 Courts strenuously observe the case-or-controversy
requirement because “[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s
proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of
federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”14 Without it, the
judicial function might “intrude upon the powers given to the other branches.”15
The standing doctrine helps ensure that federal courts do not exceed their
constitutional authority.16 In short, the doctrine contemplates that only those
who have suffered a “legal wrong” may maintain a federal lawsuit.17 To meet
this “irreducible constitutional minimum,” a “plaintiff must have (1) suffered
an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.”18
13. U.S. CONST. art III, §§ 1–2.
14. Raines, 521 U.S. at 818 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37
(1976)).
15. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006)).
16. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (“The law of Article III standing
. . . serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political
branches.”).
17. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547.
18. Id. at 1543 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)); see also Lexmark
Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125 (2014) (summarizing Article III
standing requirements).
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Beginning in the 1970s, courts wrestled with whether federal legislators or
legislative bodies could satisfy standing doctrine, with a heavy focus on the
injury-in-fact requirement.19 Cases often arose when individual members of
Congress sought judicial relief for an injury allegedly inflicted by the executive
branch. In Kennedy v. Sampson,20 for example, the D.C. Circuit held that Senator
Ted Kennedy enjoyed standing to sue the executive branch when the President
“pocket vetoed” a healthcare bill.21 In so holding, the court emphasized that
Senator Kennedy had voted for that bill and the President’s actions had injured
him by nullifying his vote.22
After some twists and turns, Kennedy and related cases established that, at
least within the D.C. Circuit, federal legislators could satisfy Article III
standing requirements.23 Each legislator enjoyed a personal interest in the
exercise of her governmental power, and harm to that interest could establish
an injury in fact.24 Though satisfaction of that requirement alone would not
allow a lawsuit to proceed, the “personal interest” approach facilitated legislator
lawsuits.25 The D.C. Circuit also adopted an “institutional interest” approach,
under which the House and Senate, as institutions, could pursue judicial relief
for injuries to their constitutional powers.26
19. See generally R. Lawrence Dessem, Congressional Standing To Sue: Whose Vote Is This, Anyway?,
62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5–9 (1986) (discussing congressional standing cases).
20. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
21. Id. at 436. Under Article I, Section 7, after Congress presents legislation to the President, he
has ten days during which to sign the bill into law or return it to the originating house. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 7, cl. 2. If the President intends to return the bill but cannot do so because Congress has
adjourned, the bill automatically expires (that is, it has been “pocket vetoed”). See id.
22. Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 435 (“The prerequisite to standing is that a party be ‘among the injured,’
in the words of Sierra Club, not that he be the most grievously or most directly injured. We think that
appellee is ‘among the injured’ in this case.”); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35
(1972) (“[T]he ‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that
the party seeking review be himself among the injured.”).
23. See Kennedy, 511 F.2d. at 434 (recognizing the plaintiff’s “injury . . . as a member of the
legislative branch of the government, an interest among those protected by article I, section 7”); Synar
v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1381–82 (D.D.C. 1986) (stating that the law of the D.C. Circuit
“recognizes a personal interest by Members of Congress in the exercise of their governmental powers,”
and “specific injury to a legislator in his official capacity may constitute cognizable harm sufficient to
confer standing upon him”). The D.C. Circuit later acknowledged that Raines had substantially
undermined some of its prior cases on congressional standing. See Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112,
115–17 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
24. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1381–82 (summarizing cases within the D.C. Circuit).
25. The personal interest approach did not reflect the only approach used by courts to embrace
legislator standing. Rather, courts also sometimes discussed whether a legislator enjoyed a “derivative
interest,” that is, whether she suffered a cognizable harm through an injury inflicted upon the chamber
of which she was a member. See Dessem, supra note 19, at 14–18. Courts also examined whether a
legislator could assert a “representative interest” for harms allegedly inflicted on the regions or persons
whom she represented. See id. at 18–22. Nuances between the personal interest, derivative interest, and
representative interest approaches do not meaningfully affect the issues discussed in this Article.
26. In Kennedy, the executive branch admitted that the House or Senate would have standing to
assert an injury to its lawmaking power. See 511 F.2d at 434. The D.C. Circuit’s apparent acceptance
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But two prominent judges on the D.C. Circuit, Robert Bork and Antonin
Scalia, questioned those approaches. Through separate opinions, each urged a
public trust approach.27 Under that approach, legislators or legislative bodies
generally suffer no judicially cognizable harms when acting in their
representational capacities.28
Barnes v. Kline29 shows how the public trust approach differs from the
personal and institutional interest approaches. In Barnes, various congressional
plaintiffs sued the executive branch over the President’s pocket veto of human
rights legislation.30 The majority opinion applied the individual interest and
institutional interest approaches and held that the congressional plaintiffs
established injuries that satisfied Article III standing requirements. For the
individual congressional plaintiffs, the court followed its analysis in Kennedy
holding there was a cognizable injury.31 For the institutional congressional
plaintiffs, the court extended Kennedy and concluded that “an injury to the
lawmaking powers of the two houses of Congress” could qualify as a judicially
cognizable injury.32
Judge Bork, writing in dissent, argued that none of these congressional
plaintiffs met Article III standing requirements. The federal legislators and
legislative bodies in Barnes sued “not because of any personal injury done [to]
them” but because they wanted “the courts [to] define and protect their
governmental powers.”33 The majority’s approach implied that “elected
representatives have a separate private right, akin to a property interest, in the

of this admission was dicta because the case involved an individual legislator as plaintiff. However, the
D.C. Circuit later held that the House or Senate could satisfy standing requirements. See infra text
accompanying note 32.
27. Judges Bork and Scalia did not expressly use the “public trust” label. This Article uses that
term to refer to the principles embraced in their dissents. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 50 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (rejecting arguments that legislators have “a separate private right, akin
to a property interest, in the powers of their offices” because it “has always been the theory, and it is
more than a metaphor, that a democratic representative holds his office in trust, that he is nothing more
nor less than a fiduciary of the people”); Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my view no officers of the United States, of whatever
Branch, exercise their governmental powers as personal prerogatives in which they have a judicially
cognizable private interest. They wield those powers not as private citizens but only through the public
office which they hold.”).
28. See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 50; Moore, 733 F.2d at 956.
29. 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
In vacating Barnes, the Court acknowledged the different approaches to standing taken by the D.C.
Circuit majority and by Judge Bork. Barnes, 479 U.S. at 362–63. However, the Court stated that it did
not need to resolve the standing question to address the mootness issue. See id. at 363.
30. See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 30.
31. Id. at 26 (“In the present action, the thirty-three individual Representatives allege an injury
identical to that of the individual lawmaker in Kennedy v. Sampson.”).
32. Id. at 26.
33. Id. at 42 (Bork, J., dissenting).
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powers of their offices.”34 Judge Bork, by contrast, believed that a “democratic
representative holds his office in trust” and “is nothing more nor less than a
fiduciary of the people.”35 Citizens and taxpayers themselves could not sue for
alleged injuries to congressional voting or legislative powers. Thus, it was
“utterly anomalous to allow the representative to sue when those he represents
may not.”36
Judge Bork also emphasized that legislative suits would undermine the
separation-of-powers principles protected by standing doctrine. That doctrine
addressed “what kinds of interests courts will undertake to protect” and kept
“courts out of areas that are not properly theirs.”37 Yet under the individual
interest and institutional interest approaches, courts could exercise “judicial
dominance” over matters otherwise reserved for the political branches.38
To Judge Bork, this dominance did not fit with “the role of the federal
courts in our polity.”39 Courts declared statutes or executive acts
unconstitutional “out of necessity, and as a last resort.”40 This “awesome power”
fit within our representative structure only because it was “confined, limited,
and tamed” by standing doctrine.41 Courts traditionally acted only when they
had to address the rights of private persons.42 Thus, Judge Bork “would have no
hesitation in reaching and deciding the substantive question” in Barnes if it
“were a suit by a private party who had a direct stake in the outcome.”43
However, no such party was present in this case.
Judge Bork also argued that the “complete novelty” of the majority’s
approach should have given it pause.44 For more than 175 years, “litigation
directly between Congress and the President” was unknown.45 The D.C. Circuit
had therefore affected “a major shift in basic constitutional arrangements,” and
its approach carried consequences beyond interbranch disputes.46 The D.C.
Circuit had already held that individual legislators enjoyed standing to sue each
other in federal court, and lawsuits between the Senate and the House did not

34. Id. at 50.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 51.
37. Id. at 43.
38. Id. at 44.
39. Id. at 52.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 46 (discussing how the President could judicially challenge the constitutionality of
the legislative vetoes only after waiting for some “private person to raise the issue” in INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
43. Id. at 48.
44. Id. at 41.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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seem far off.47 Courts were thus becoming “not only a part of the legislative
process but perhaps the most important part.”48
That the Constitution expressly recognizes lawsuits by states themselves49
only further proved Judge Bork’s point.50 The Framers knew that they should
specify the judiciary’s authority to hear, for example, a lawsuit between states
or a lawsuit by a citizen of one state against another state.51 Judge Bork thus
doubted that the judicial power to hear federal interbranch disputes could be
derived through implication. It would be “incredible that Framers who intended
to extend judicial power to direct controversies between Congress and the
President failed to include so important a category in their recitation.”52
Judge Bork also believed that the majority’s reasoning meant that courts
could be pulled into purely intrabranch disputes. One agency that believed
another agency had regulated within its sphere could seek relief from the courts,
rather than from the President.53 Similarly, a district court judge who believed
that an appellate court had improperly limited her jurisdiction could petition
the Supreme Court for redress.54 Given these implications, Judge Bork believed
that the Barnes majority should have “renounce[d] outright” the individual
interest and institutional interest approaches.55 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit
maintained its jurisdiction over interbranch lawsuits.
47. See id. at 41 (referencing Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Bork,
J., dissenting) and Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia,
J., concurring)). Though the D.C. Circuit had held that it enjoyed jurisdiction over intrabranch and
interbranch lawsuits, it invoked an “equitable discretion” doctrine to sometimes decline to hear those
suits. See Dessem, supra note 19, at 9–13 (discussing cases). In Chenoweth v. Clinton, the D.C. Circuit
recognized the troubled history of its equitable discretion doctrine. See 181 F.3d 112, 114 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
48. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 46 (Bork, J., dissenting).
49. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
50. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 57 (Bork, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Id. Complex issues arise when a state sues the federal government. See RICHARD H. FALLON,
JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 263–66 (9th ed. 2015) (“The cases on the standing of states to sue the
federal government seem to depend on the kind of claim that the state advances. The decisions . . . are
hard to reconcile.”). The Court applies the injury-in-fact requirement to states but remains mindful
that they “surrender[ed] certain sovereign prerogatives” when they joined the Union. Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007). Given the “special” treatment given to states, see id. at 520, standing
doctrine principles developed through state-initiated lawsuits do not easily translate to other contexts.
For further scholarly commentary, see generally Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United
States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (2016) (arguing that though states have wide discretion in
challenging state law in federal courts, they should enjoy no “special interest” in challenging the
implementation of federal law).
53. Barnes, 759 F.2d at 47 (Bork, J., dissenting) (“The head of an agency who believes that another
agency has improperly encroached on an area confided to his administration by statute or regulation
no longer need bring the dispute before the President, for the courts stand ready to resolve it.”).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 41.
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The Supreme Court Weighs in

Though Judge Bork could not sway his colleagues, the Supreme Court
partially followed his public trust approach in Raines.56 That case arose when six
federal legislators argued that the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutionally
expanded the executive power, and that its cancellation mechanisms violated
Article I’s bicameralism and presentment requirements.57 This, they alleged,
harmed them in their official capacities. Any veto under the Act would alter the
legislators’ votes, remove them from their constitutional role in the repeal of
legislation, and improperly alter the balance of power between the branches.58
The Court, in a 7–2 decision, concluded that the legislators lacked standing
to assert these arguments.59 Like Judge Bork, the Justices emphasized the
separation-of-powers principles protected by standing doctrine and warned that
courts exercise jurisdiction only as a last resort.60 They would thus set “aside the
natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of this important dispute and to
‘settle’ it for the sake of convenience and efficiency.”61 The Court would instead
examine whether the legislators’ alleged injuries were “personal, particularized,
concrete, and otherwise judicially cognizable.”62
The Court held that they were not. The legislators had alleged an
institutional injury that damaged all members of Congress and both Houses of
Congress equally.63 Additionally, the legislators did not allege any loss to their
private rights. Rather, the alleged injuries arose solely through their official
positions. If one of the legislators “were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer
have a claim; the claim would be possessed by his successor instead.”64 Thus,
any alleged injury ran with each legislator’s seat, which he “holds (it may quite
56. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 825–29 (1997). The Court did not expressly state that it was
following Judge Bork, but its decision echoes many of the points he made in Barnes. See id. Also, the
Court noted that the D.C. Circuit embraced congressional standing over “strong dissent” by Judge
Bork and then-Judge Scalia. Id. at 820 n.4.
57. Id. at 816; see also Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104–130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996), invalidated
by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). The Act did not mention the President’s veto of
legislation. See Line Item Veto Act, §§ 1–5, 100 Stat. at 1200–12. Rather, it contemplated that the
President could “cancel” some spending and tax benefit measures before he signed bills into law. Id. at
§ 2(a), 100 Stat. at 1200; Raines, 521 U.S. at 814.
58. Raines, 521 U.S. at 816.
59. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court majority, while Justices Breyer and Stevens each
wrote separate dissents. See id. at 811; id. at 837 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he deprivation of the
right possessed by each Senator and Representative to vote for or against the precise text of any bill
before it becomes law must also be a sufficient injury to create Article III standing for them.”); id. at
841 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (rejecting the claim that the Constitution draws “an absolute line between
disputes involving a ‘personal’ harm and those involving an ‘official’ harm”).
60. Id. at 819–20 (majority opinion).
61. Id. at 820.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 821.
64. Id.
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arguably be said) as trustee for his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal
power.”65
Historical practice supported the Court’s reasoning. Like Judge Bork, the
Court explored the history of interbranch conflicts and noted that those
conflicts were resolved outside the judiciary.66 For example, under the theory
advanced by the legislators, President Andrew Johnson could have sued
Congress over statutory restrictions on his removal power. But it did not occur
to him, nor to succeeding Presidents, to do so.67 Instead, the Court addressed
restrictions on the President’s removal authority much later in Myers v. United
States.68 The plaintiff in Myers was a former federal official who believed that
he had been improperly terminated and sued for relief.69 In this procedural
context, involving a private injury (lost federal salary payments), the Court
struck down the contested statutory restrictions on the President’s removal
authority.70
The controversy over the legislative veto similarly showed that the Court
resolved weighty constitutional questions only when private rights were at
stake.71 In INS v. Chadha,72 the Court invalidated a statute through which one
house of Congress could nullify some deportation decisions made by the
Attorney General.73 That controversy arose not when the Attorney General
sued Congress for infringing his authority74 but when a private person, Jagdish
Chadha, faced deportation and challenged the statute.75 The Court in Raines

65. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)
(“It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other
governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents and prove
unfaithful to their important trust.”)).
66. Id. at 826–29.
67. Id. at 826–28.
68. 272 U.S. 52 (1926); see also Raines, 521 U.S. at 827–28 (discussing Myers, 272 U.S. at 106–07,
173, 176).
69. Myers, 272 U.S. at 106.
70. Id. at 176; see also Raines, 521 U.S. at 827–28. The statute at issue in Myers provided that
various postmasters could not be terminated without Senate consent. See 272 U.S. at 106. The
Postmaster General, at the direction of the President, terminated Myers, even though the Senate had
not consented to his termination. See id. The Court ultimately held that the Senate-consent restriction
was unconstitutional. See id. at 174–75.
71. Raines, 521 U.S. at 828; see also David A. Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise
of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L. REV. 253, 256–59 (1982) (describing different legislative veto regimes,
through which a single house or a single congressional committee could block executive branch actions
outside the Article I bicameralism and presentment process).
72. 462 U.S. 919 (1983), invalidating Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 244(c)(2), 66
Stat. 163, 216 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1) (repealed 1996)).
73. Id. at 959.
74. Raines, 521 U.S. at 828 (noting that, if the legislative plaintiffs in Raines had standing, then
the Attorney General in Chadha would also have had standing to challenge the one-House veto
provision at issue because it rendered his authority provisional rather than final).
75. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 927–29 (describing Chadha’s potential deportation).
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thus observed that judicial resolution of direct interbranch disputes would run
“contrary to historical experience.”76
The Court did not fully embrace the public trust approach, however.
Though its reasoning followed Judge Bork’s, the Court left open whether the
House or Senate would have had standing to challenge the Line Item Veto
Act.77 Neither the House nor the Senate authorized the Raines plaintiffs’
lawsuit, and the Court initially attached “some importance” to this.78 But then
the Court quickly backtracked, saying that it would “not now decide” whether
anything would change if House or Senate authorization were present.79
The Supreme Court has thus rejected the personal interest approach to
congressional standing.80 Legislators cannot satisfy Article III standing
requirements by alleging that they have suffered injuries in their
representational capacities. Nor can they assert injuries on the behalf of the
House or Senate.81 Raines leaves open whether the House or Senate can
themselves do so.
After Raines, the Justices have expressed different views on whether harms
alleged by the House or Senate would be judicially cognizable. For example,
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer embraced the institutional interest approach
when they concluded that the House enjoyed standing to challenge how the
Department of Commerce conducted the 2000 census.82 They believed that
because the census would determine each state’s congressional delegation, the
House could assert a concrete and particularized interest in preventing its
unlawful composition.83 The Court majority resolved the census dispute
without reaching the congressional standing question.84
76. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829.
77. Eventually, the Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act in a case did that not involve an
interbranch conflict. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 420–21 (1998).
78. Raines, 521 U.S. at 812, 829.
79. Id. at 829–30.
80. For further commentary about why the Supreme Court might have been skeptical about the
D.C. Circuit’s embrace of congressional standing, see Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of
Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the Modern Supreme Court’s Attempt To Control Constitutional Confrontations,
86 GEO. L.J. 351, 354 (1997) (“The Court . . . finds little institutional gain in immersing itself in the
resolution of highly charged intramural squabbles brought by disgruntled members of Congress . . . .
[But the D.C. Circuit’s] approval of congressional standing enhances its power inside the Washington
beltway . . . .”).
81. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829; see also Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1953
(2019) (“[I]ndividual members lack standing to assert the institutional interests of a legislature.” (citing
Raines, 521 U.S. at 829)).
82. Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 357, 364–65 (1999)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens’s dissent had three parts, the third of which expressed his view
that the House of Representatives had standing to pursue its claims. Of the three other dissenters, only
Justice Breyer joined that part. See id.
83. Id. at 364–65.
84. Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives included two consolidated cases, one
which the House initiated. The Court held that by resolving the case that involved the non-House
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In United States v. Windsor,85 Justice Alito’s dissent blessed the institutional
interest approach for “the narrow category of cases in which a court strikes down
an Act of Congress and the Executive declines to defend the Act.”86 In those
circumstances, Justice Alito wrote, “Congress both has standing to defend the
undefended statute and is a proper party to do so.”87 Courts impair the
“legislative power by striking down an Act of Congress,” and the House or
Senate would have standing to protect this institutional interest.88 But Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, fiercely criticized
Justice Alito’s approach. Those Justices found no basis for the claim that
“Congress can hale the Executive before the courts not only to vindicate its own
institutional powers to act, but to correct a perceived inadequacy in the
execution of its laws.”89
The law on congressional standing thus remains a mess. Raines rejected
the personal interest approach, but it remains unclear which approach the Court
might use going forward. The institutional interest and the public trust
approaches have each drawn support from some Justices, but no discernible
majority yet exists for either.
II. CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS UNDER THE PUBLIC TRUST APPROACH
This part addresses the specific standing issues that may arise in an
interbranch dispute over a congressional subpoena. Section A describes
Congress’s investigative authority and discusses how the D.C. Circuit, in the
1970s, found jurisdiction in two interbranch subpoena disputes. In recent years,
district court judges within the D.C. Circuit have found similarly. Under their
institutional interest approach, the House or Senate would generally enjoy
standing to judicially enforce subpoenas.
Section B examines how a court that adopts the public trust approach
should address congressional subpoena disputes. It concludes that under the
public trust approach, the House or Senate can never judicially enforce a
subpoena against the executive branch.
plaintiffs, the House’s lawsuit no longer presented a “substantial federal question” and would therefore
be dismissed. Id. at 344.
85. 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
86. Id. at 807 (Alito, J., dissenting). The majority opinion in Windsor did not address issues related
to congressional standing because the Court found that a noncongressional party satisfied Article III
requirements. Id. at 744–45 (majority opinion). For further discussion of whether Congress enjoys
standing to sue executive branch officials regarding their failure to enforce a law, see John Harrison,
Legislative Power, Executive Duty, and Legislative Lawsuits, 31 J.L. & POL. 103, 104–05 (2015) (“The
Constitution does not authorize federal legislators or legislative chambers to sue executive officials to
compel them properly to execute the law, with no claim other than executive failure to do so. Nor does
it allow Congress to provide for lawsuits of that kind by statute.”).
87. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 807 (Alito, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 805.
89. Id. at 788–89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

98 N.C. L. REV. 1043 (2020)

2020]
A.

CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS

1055

Congressional Subpoena Authority

As a “necessary incident”90 to its legislative or other constitutional
powers,91 Congress enjoys broad investigative authority. The Court has
recognized that Congress “cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence
of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change.”92 The relevant conditions do not relate only to enacted
legislation but also extend to “defects in our social, economic or political
system.”93 Thus, Congress, through its two houses, can properly investigate and
issue subpoenas on many different subjects.
In most cases, Congress does not face barriers when it seeks information.
Many people readily share their insights with Congress.94 Written and oral
testimony may satisfy a civic duty or provide a sense of pride.95 Citizens often
want to share their thoughts with Congress and want to be heard.96
If potential witnesses refuse to testify or provide documents, Congress can
exert power over them. Those who defy congressional subpoenas face potential

90. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959) (“The scope of the power of inquiry . . .
is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the
Constitution.”); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 144 (1935) (noting the plaintiff’s concession that
the Senate committee “had authority to require the production of [his] papers as a necessary incident
of the power of legislation”).
91. Congress can perform investigations related to nonlegislative constitutional powers. See Barry
v. U.S. ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 616 (1929) (noting that the Senate enjoys investigatory
authority when it “acts as a judicial tribunal” and judges “the elections, returns, and qualifications of
its members”).
92. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
93. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
94. See, e.g., Noah Weiland, Impeachment Briefing: Highlights from Legal Experts’ Testimony, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/us/politics/impeachment-hearinghighlights.html [https://perma.cc/FC9G-FTKL (dark archive)] (summarizing the testimony of four
law professors invited to discuss the constitutional permissibility of impeaching President Trump,
including Professor Michael Gerhardt who authored the introduction to this symposium).
95. See, e.g., 20 Celebrities Who Testified Before Congress, NAT’L J. (May 11, 2015),
https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/52349 [https://perma.cc/SPY8-UVV7 (dark archive)] (compiling
images of celebrities who have appeared before Congress, almost exclusively to advocate for
philanthropic causes they support).
96. See David Morgan, Ex-Trump Campaign Chief Lewandowski Says ‘Happy’ to Testify Before
Congress, REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-lewandowski/extrump-campaign-chief-lewandowski-says-happy-to-testify-before-congress-idUSKCN1V6244
[https://perma.cc/HA89-EYNX] (“Now a private citizen, Lewandowski said he looked forward to the
chance to testify as ‘a guy who’s going to fight back’ . . . [and that he] ‘want[s] to go and remind the
American people that these guys are on a witch hunt, right?’”); Jessica Taylor, With Town Hall Script
Flipped on GOP, Will History Repeat Itself?, NPR (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/
02/17/515669097/with-town-hall-script-flipped-on-gop-will-history-repeat-itself
[https://perma.cc/
P5HF-8RNW] (covering the swaths of protestors flooding legislators’ town halls in response to
proposals that would repeal healthcare legislation).
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detention by Congress97 or, more likely,98 criminal prosecution by the
Department of Justice.99 The Supreme Court has upheld several convictions for
contempt of Congress.100
But Congress exercises less power over federal officials than it does over
private persons.101 When the Attorney General advises a federal official that she
need not comply with a congressional subpoena, the official probably will not
fear prosecution from the Justice Department.102 Even so, the executive branch

97. See United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“[A] witness who refused to
testify was committed to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the respective House until he was willing to ‘purge’
himself of his contempt by supplying the requested information, but his confinement could not extend
beyond the term of the session . . . .”); TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34097,
CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS:
LAW, HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 10 (2017) [hereinafter GARVEY, ENFORCEMENT]
(“Under the inherent contempt power the individual is brought before the House or Senate by the
Sergeant-at-Arms, tried at the bar of the body, and can be imprisoned or detained in the Capitol or
perhaps elsewhere.”); James Hamilton, Robert F. Muse & Kevin R. Amer, Congressional Investigations:
Politics and Process, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1115, 1132–33 (2007) (discussing principles established by
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821), and later Supreme Court cases).
98. The House and Senate have each long abandoned inherent contempt measures. See Michael
A. Zuckerman, The Court of Congressional Contempt, 25 J.L. & POL. 41, 43 (2009) (“Congress has not
exercised its direct contempt powers in any significant way since 1935.”).
99. See 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2018) (stating that any person who willfully refuses to “produce papers
upon any matter under inquiry before either House” will be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor); see also
id. § 194 (describing the procedure by which the relevant congressional leader will describe a failure to
comply under 2 U.S.C. § 192 “to the appropriate United States attorney, whose duty it shall be to
bring the matter before the grand jury for its action”). In unconventional cases, a subpoenaed person
might himself mount a physical defense. See Richard K. Neumann Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a
Partisan Political Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 161, 185–87 (2007) (discussing the “strange
impeachment” of Judge Charles Pickering, who was likely not of sound mind, and his demand for “trial
by battle” upon being served by Senate subpoenas (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting PETER
CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635–1805, at 212 (1984))).
100. Andrew McCanse Wright, Constitutional Conflict and Congressional Oversight, 98 MARQ. L.
REV. 881, 898 n.76 (2014) (summarizing cases).
101. Whether congressional arrests of executive branch officials violate the separation of powers
remains an open question. That said, there have been at least two such arrests in our history. See Josh
Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1135–38 (2009) (describing
congressional arrests of two executive branch officials, with one occurring in 1879 and the other in
1916); cf. Stanley M. Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving a Prompt and
Orderly Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands Against Executive Branch Officials, 36
CATH. U. L. REV. 71, 71–72 (1986) (“Although there is arguably no constitutional impediment to the
use of compulsion against an Executive Branch official who has refused to comply with a congressional
subpoena, there are nevertheless several practical constraints . . . .”).
102. The criminal contempt of Congress statute contemplates prosecution by a United States
Attorney. See 2 U.S.C. § 194. The Attorney General heads the Department of Justice in which United
States Attorneys serve. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 503, 509, 541 (2018). It thus seems unlikely that an executive
branch official who follows the Attorney General’s advice will face criminal prosecution under 2 U.S.C.
§ 194. A federal official who followed the Attorney General’s advice might face criminal prosecution
by a subsequent administration, although this would seem rather aggressive. Prosecution by a
subsequent administration, if ever justified in this context, should be directed towards officials who
give legal advice rather than subordinates who follow that advice.
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routinely complies with congressional demands for information.103 Congress,
after all, establishes and funds executive branch agencies.104 A collegial
relationship and open communication serves each branch’s interests.105 Thus,
the executive and legislative branches often resolve disputes through a
negotiation and accommodation process.106
When that process fails, Congress historically has not sought judicial
relief. But things began to change during the Watergate scandal.107 In Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,108 a congressional
committee tried to judicially enforce a subpoena for materials held by President

103. See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45653, CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS:
ENFORCING EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMPLIANCE 1 (2019) [hereinafter GARVEY, COMPLIANCE]
(“Executive branch officials comply with most congressional requests for information.”). For further
discussion of how Congress uses its powers to investigate and influence executive branch agencies, see
generally Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006)
[hereinafter Beermann, Administration]. See also id. at 106 (“It is impossible to overstate the volume of
reporting requirements Congress includes in legislation directed at agencies and the President.”).
Though interbranch informational disputes inevitably arise, they seem like deviations from the norm.
For a survey of various disputes, see History of Refusals by Exec. Branch Officials to Provide Info.
Demanded by Congress, 6 Op. O.L.C. 751, 752–71 (1982) (discussing different instances in history
where executive branch officials have refused to disclose information requested by Congress).
104. See Beermann, Administration, supra note 103, at 68, 127; see also Jonathan G. Pray,
Congressional Reporting Requirements: Testing the Limits of the Oversight Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 297,
304, 311 n.108 (2005) (“The power to create executive agencies is vested in Congress, not the President.
Implicit in this power to create is the authority to monitor and investigate. . . . [Moreover,] Congress
ultimately holds the power of the purse and can credibly threaten the funding of [an] agency causing
it problems.”).
105. See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal–Do
Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 114 (1996) (“Congress and the executive have strong incentives to
work with each other.”); Paul R. Verkuil, A Proposal To Resolve Interbranch Disputes on the Practice Field,
40 CATH. U. L. REV. 839, 842–43 (1991) (“There is, at one level, no more routine practice than the
sharing of information between executive officials and congressional committees. Both branches have
strong interests in the process; Congress to perform its oversight function and the Executive to ensure
that it can perform its constitutionally assigned tasks.”).
106. See Comm. on Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 56 (D.D.C. 2008) (referring to “the
process of negotiation and accommodation that most often leads to resolution of disputes between the
political branches”).
107. See GARVEY, COMPLIANCE, supra note 103, at 12 (“[T]he courts do not appear to have
entertained a civil action to enforce a congressional subpoena against an executive official until the
Watergate era.” (citing Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d
725 (D.C. Cir. 1974))); Michael Stern, Congressional Standing To Sue: A Response to Grove and Devins on
the History of Congressional Litigation, POINT ORD. (May 7, 2015), https://www.pointoforder.com/
2015/05/07/congressional-standing-to-sue-a-response-to-grove-and-devins-on-the-history-ofcongressional-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/GER6-4UYL] (“During the 1970s, particularly during
Watergate itself, Congress became (somewhat) more litigious, reflecting factors such as (1) the
increasing litigiousness of society itself, (2) an increasing tendency to see congressional-executive
disputes as essentially legal in nature and (3) the development of institutional legal offices in both
Houses.”).
108. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc).
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Richard Nixon.109 The D.C. Circuit rejected the case on the merits, finding that
the committee’s needs were “too attenuated and too tangential” to justify the
committee’s demand.110 The court did not raise or discuss any constitutional
standing restrictions that might apply in an interbranch subpoena dispute.
The D.C. Circuit later recognized the significance of the issues. In United
States v. AT&T,111 (AT&T I) the executive branch filed a lawsuit to challenge a
congressional subpoena directed towards a private telecommunications
company.112 The subpoenaed information related to sensitive FBI requests, and
the executive branch sued to enjoin the subpoena’s enforcement.113 Though the
executive branch had nominally sued AT&T, the “real defendant in interest”
was the House of Representatives.114 The House had intervened in the litigation
through its subcommittee,115 and this set up a “portentous clash between the
executive and legislative branches.”116
The subcommittee alleged that the judiciary could not enjoin a
congressional subpoena. But the court disagreed: “[T]he mere fact that there is
a conflict between the legislative and executive branches over a congressional
subpoena does not preclude judicial resolution of the conflict.”117 In a later
proceeding, the court rejected other justiciability arguments made by the
subcommittee and held largely for the Executive.118
It is unclear how AT&T I bears on congressionally initiated subpoena
lawsuits. The case arose when the executive branch sued a private company, not
when the House initiated a lawsuit. This distinction carries constitutional
significance. When the executive branch files a lawsuit, it may establish
standing through its Article II authority to represent the interests of the United
States.119 It need not show the Article III injury required from other litigants.
109. See id. at 726. The court in Senate Select Committee did not discuss standing issues related to
interbranch disputes.
110. Id. at 733.
111. 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also id. at 390 n.8 (citing competing academic views on
justiciability issues raised by some interbranch disputes).
112. Id. at 385.
113. Id. at 385–87.
114. Id. at 385.
115. Id. (noting that the subcommittee chairman had intervened in the litigation on the House’s
behalf).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 390.
118. United States v. AT&T (AT&T II), 567 F.2d 121, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (enjoining AT&T in
a later case, on a conditional basis, from complying with the congressional subpoena).
119. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (“A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a
breach of the law, and it is to the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the
responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3));
see also Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1314 (2014) (“In sharp
contrast to private parties, the executive may bring suit to enforce or defend federal law, absent a
showing of concrete injury.”); id. at 1324–28 (discussing various Court cases). A state usually assigns
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Thus, the executive branch’s standing to enjoin a congressional subpoena does
not imply the legislative branch’s standing to enforce one.
In AT&T I, the D.C. Circuit broadly stated that the “House as a whole
has standing to assert its investigatory power.”120 In doing so, it cited no
authorities and did not mention the injury-in-fact requirement.121 This may
have been understandable because the Supreme Court expressed that
requirement only a few years earlier in an Administrative Procedure Act case.122
It was not until the 1980s that today’s three-part standing test became
familiar.123 The D.C. Circuit may have thus missed the injury-in-fact issue.124
In any event, Raines now establishes that the injury-in-fact requirement
plays a central role in interbranch disputes. The executive branch has thus

litigation responsibility to its executive branch, but that is not inevitably so. See Va. House of Delegates
v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1951, 1953 (2019) (recognizing that one house of the Virginia
legislature could satisfy federal standing requirements by showing either that the state had authorized
it to represent the state’s interests or by demonstrating injury-in-fact); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570
U.S. 693, 710 (2013) (“[A] State must be able to designate agents to represent it in federal court. . . .
That agent is typically the State’s attorney general. But state law may provide for other officials to
speak for the State in federal court.”).
120. 551 F.2d at 391.
121. The D.C. Circuit focused heavily on the political question doctrine, rather than standing
requirements. See id. at 390–91; see also AT&T II, 567 F.2d at 125–27 (concluding that the political
question doctrine did not bar jurisdiction over the controversy). When the political question doctrine
applies, “a court lacks the authority to decide the dispute before it.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v.
Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (listing factors
relevant to whether a nonjusticiable political question exists). If a court finds that the political question
doctrine does not apply, that finding does not automatically establish its jurisdiction over the case.
Rather, other requirements, including those related to standing, must be satisfied. See Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974) (explaining that standing doctrine and
political question doctrine present “distinct and separate” limitations). Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s
political question analysis does not resolve whether the defiance of a congressional committee
establishes a judicially cognizable harm.
122. See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). In Kennedy
v. Sampson, which arose prior to AT&T I, the D.C. Circuit cited Data Processing. See 511 F.2d 430, 433
(D.C. Cir. 1974). But it did not believe that that case established a uniform standing test. See id. (citing
Data Processing to show that “[a] somewhat different analysis of standing has been employed with
respect to parties who challenge administrative action”).
123. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found.,
454 U.S. 151, 161 (1981); see also Heather Elliott, The Structure of Standing at 25: Introduction to the
Symposium, 65 ALA. L. REV. 269, 269 (2013) (“The injury-in-fact requirement had emerged by the
early 1970s, as had aspects of the traceability and redressability requirements, but the Court did not
state the test as a tripartite requirement until the 1980s.”).
124. Arguably, the D.C. Circuit should have been more mindful of Court decisions as it addressed
interbranch lawsuits. See Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH.
L. REV. 339, 361–62 (2015) (“The D.C. Circuit’s position in the early 1970s flouted the Supreme
Court’s then-evolving test for standing by not calling for a congressional plaintiff to establish an injury
in fact, and therefore also ignored standing’s separation-of-powers underpinnings.”).
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repeatedly argued that Congress cannot judicially enforce subpoenas,125 and has
dismissed the legislature’s reliance on AT&T I.126
District court judges within the D.C. Circuit have nonetheless concluded
that congressional committees may judicially enforce subpoenas against the
executive branch.127 Their opinions pick up where AT&T I left off and wrestle
with the injury-in-fact requirement. Under their decisions, a harm to
congressional investigatory authority may qualify as a judicially cognizable
injury-in-fact.128 These courts thus do not apply the public trust approach. To
defeat a congressional subpoena, the executive branch must rely on privileges
or other doctrines.129
B.

The Public Trust Approach: A Subpoena Exception?

The limited case law does not reveal how a judge who adopts the public
trust approach would address a congressional subpoena dispute. At first glance,
the issues might seem straightforward. As Section I.A discussed, under the
125. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 14–33, Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 951
F.3d 510 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (No. 19-5331); Memorandum of Plaintiff & Affidavit in Support of
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on Counts I and II at 22–37, Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008)
(No. 08-0409); Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 22–35, Comm. on
Oversight v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-1332).
126. Before the Court decided Raines, and during the D.C. Circuit’s broad embrace of
congressional standing, the executive branch believed that courts could entertain a congressionally
initiated subpoena dispute. See Response to Cong. Requests for Info. Regarding Decisions Made Under
the Indep. Counsel Act, 10 Op. O.L.C. 68, 87–88 (1986).
127. See Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 148, 178 (D.D.C. 2019) (“The
veritable death-knell with respect to DOJ’s present non-justiciability suggestions is the D.C. Circuit’s
jurisdictional analysis in AT&T I.”), vacated, 951 F.3d 510 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 28, 2020), reh’g en banc
granted sub nom. House of Representatives v. Mnunchin, No. 19-1576, 2020 WL 1228477 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (en banc); Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C.
2013) (continuing to treat AT&T I as “the law in this Circuit”); Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 at 68
(rejecting argument that Raines abrogated AT&T I).
128. See McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 148 at 192 (“[T]he Judiciary Committee has alleged an actual
and concrete injury to its right to compel information . . . .”); Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 21 (stating
that the executive branch’s defiance of a House committee subpoena established a “clearly delineated,
concrete injury to the institution”); Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (“The injury incurred by the
Committee, for Article III purposes, is both the loss of information to which it is entitled and the
institutional diminution of its subpoena power.”); see also U.S. House of Representatives v. U.S. Dep’t
of Commerce, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76, 86 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[I]t [is] well established that a legislative body
suffers a redressable injury when that body cannot receive information necessary to carry out its
constitutional responsibilities. This right to receive information arises primarily in subpoena
enforcement cases, where a house of Congress or a congressional committee seeks to compel
information in aid of its legislative function.”), prob. juris. noted, 524 U.S. 978 (1998) (mem.), appeal
dismissed, 525 U.S. 316 (1999); Nash, supra note 124, at 374 (“[A]n impediment to Congress’s
investigatory power and processes injures Congress’s ability to legislate effectively. Accordingly, it is
clear that Congress suffers an injury when its investigative efforts are stymied.”).
129. For a general discussion of the various limitations that may apply to a congressional subpoena,
see GARVEY, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 97, at 52–73.
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public trust approach a legislative body exists as a representative of the people.
Thus, an alleged harm to the House or Senate cannot be personal in the way
contemplated by the injury-in-fact requirement, whether the harm relates to
informational demands or anything else.
But courts might treat subpoena disputes differently from other
interbranch disputes. In U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin,130 for example,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that the House lacked
standing to sue the executive branch under an Appropriations Clause claim.131
In doing so, it distinguished cases related to congressional subpoenas.132 And
Judge Bork, in his Barnes dissent, cited Kennedy as the first case through which
the D.C. Circuit addressed an interbranch dispute, even though Senate Select
Committee had been decided earlier.133 This might imply, however weakly, that
Judge Bork would not extend the public trust approach to interbranch subpoena
disputes.134
Nonetheless, a court that applies the public trust approach should reject
any subpoena exceptions. Various functional and policy arguments might
support that exception, but those arguments do not undermine the theory
behind the public trust approach.
One functional argument may relate to each chamber’s inherent contempt
authority. If a government official defies a congressional subpoena, the House
or Senate might detain her.135 Then, she may judicially challenge her detention
130. 379 F. Supp. 3d 8 (D.D.C. 2019), en banc review granted, No. 19-1576, 2020 WL 1228477
(D.C. Cr. 2020) (en banc).
131. Id. at 23 (“[C]onsidering the House’s burden to establish it has standing, the lack of any
binding precedent showing that it does, and the teachings of Raines and Arizona State Legislature, the
Court cannot assume jurisdiction to proceed to the merits.”).
132. See id. at 16 (“[U]sing the Judiciary to vindicate the House’s investigatory power is
constitutionally distinct from seeking Article III standing for a supposed harm to Congress’s
Appropriations power.”). The district court in Mnuchin noted the executive branch’s arguments that
prior cases on interbranch congressional subpoena disputes were incorrectly decided. See id. at 17 n.4.
But the court determined that it did not need to address cases on Congress’s investigatory power,
because it could decide the case through analysis of Congress’s appropriations power. See id.
133. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacating as moot sub
nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). The Kennedy opinion enjoyed special influence in how the
D.C. Circuit developed its standing doctrine, so Judge Bork may have cited the case for that reason.
See Dessem, supra note 19, at 6 (noting that Kennedy had become “the seminal case on congressional
standing”). Dessem also discusses how the D.C. Circuit in Kennedy did not cite another congressional
standing case, Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973), even though the district court and
congressional plaintiff in Kennedy had relied on it. Dessem, supra note 19, at 6.
134. See Barnes, 759 F.2d at 41 (Bork, J., dissenting). Though one is left to guess, Judge Bork may
have cited Kennedy rather than Senate Select Committee because the latter case involved no meaningful
discussion of how Article III applies to interbranch disputes. See id.
135. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text; see also GARVEY, ENFORCEMENT, supra note
97, at 14–15 (“As applied to subpoena enforcement, the Supreme Court has affirmed the existence of
each house’s constitutionally based authority to arrest and detain individuals for refusing to comply
with congressional demands for information.”)
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through a habeas corpus petition.136 If this path were followed, a court would
enjoy jurisdiction to resolve a dispute involving a congressional subpoena. The
detained person, after all, would suffer a judicially cognizable injury. She would
also satisfy the other Article III standing requirements.137 One might thus
naturally ask: If a detained person enjoys standing to challenge a subpoena, why
would Congress not have standing to enforce it?138
The injury-in-fact requirement answers that question. To establish that
element, the plaintiff must show its own injury. Showing that the plaintiff will
injure someone else does not suffice. The plaintiff’s injury arises when the
plaintiff gets punched, not when the plaintiff punches someone else.139 A federal
official’s ability to challenge her detention thus does not establish Congress’s
right to judicially enforce a subpoena against her.
To justify jurisdiction over congressional subpoena lawsuits, a court might
emphasize each house’s independent investigative authority. Though the two
chambers jointly share constitutional authority over some matters, the House
and Senate can unilaterally summon witnesses or perform investigations.140
136. See U.S. Servicemen’s Fund v. Eastland, 488 F.2d 1252, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (describing
methods through which a person may challenge a congressional subpoena), rev’d on other grounds, 421
U.S. 491 (1975); United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (discussing historical
inherent contempt procedures, under which congressional detention “could always be challenged by
habeas corpus”); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 92 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing
potential judicial resolution of congressional subpoena controversy through a habeas proceeding); see
also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 197 (1880) (“[W]e cannot give our assent to the principle
that, by the mere act of asserting a person to be guilty of a contempt, [the houses of Congress] thereby
establish their right to fine and imprison him, beyond the power of any court or any other tribunal
whatever to inquire into the grounds on which the order was made.”).
137. If, for example, the House detained a person, that person’s detention would be traceable to
the House’s actions and could be redressed through a judicial order mandating her release. See Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (discussing standing doctrine’s traceability and
redressability requirements).
138. See Michael Stern, The Reed Case and Congressional Standing, POINT ORD. (May 14, 2008),
https://www.pointoforder.com/2008/05/14/the-reed-case-and-congressional-standing/
[https://perma.cc/Y853-TMSV] (“If the judicial power extends to a claim for relief by an individual
who has been sanctioned by Congress for refusing to provide information, it must also extend to a
congressional action alleging that the individual is subject to sanction for this refusal.”).
139. In some cases, a plaintiff can obtain judicial relief before suffering an injury-in-fact. See
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013) (finding that a “certainly impending” injury
may satisfy standing requirements); see also 11A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY
K. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2941 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing procedures for
obtaining injunctive relief in federal courts).
140. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 172 (1927) (noting that either chamber may
independently “conduct investigations and exact testimony from witnesses for legislative purposes”).
Neither chamber of Congress enjoys independent legislative authority. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1
(vesting the legislative power in the Congress as a whole). Each house needs the assent of the other to
pass legislation and, unless a veto may be overcome, the assent of the President. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 7, cls. 2–3; see also Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power To Represent Itself
in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 607 (2014) (“Article I confers no independent ‘legislative power’
on either the House or the Senate but requires them to work together and with the President to enact
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Thus, for example, if the House sought judicial enforcement for a subpoena, it
would not need the assent of its sister chamber. A court, then, would not need
to wrestle with whether the House enjoys authority to assert the interests held
by Congress as a whole.141
But each house’s independent investigative authority does not affect the
principles underlying the public trust approach. Whether the Constitution vests
joint or independent investigatory authority, in neither situation will harms to
that authority be personal. After all, the House’s or the Senate’s investigative
authority does not establish any Representative’s or Senator’s personal, private
right142 to demand information from the executive branch.143 Thus, harms to
congressional investigative authority do not establish judicially cognizable
injuries.
laws.”). Thus, each house’s investigatory authority most sensibly stems from its authority to propose
legislation or to concur with legislation passed by the other house, as contemplated by Article I, Section
1 and as detailed in Article I, Section 7. Cf. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. at 192 (referring to the
House’s “exclusive right” to propose revenue legislation). It is thus hardly obvious that alleged injuries
to a chamber’s investigative authority, whether or not judicially cognizable, are constitutionally
different from other alleged injuries. After all, even if a given house of Congress cannot itself pass
appropriations legislation, that house enjoys the authority to propose or concur with appropriations
bills.
141. See Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1953–54 (2019) (“[A] single
House of a bicameral legislature lacks capacity to assert interests belonging to the legislature as a
whole.”).
142. Cf. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 7 (1892) (“The two houses of Congress are legislative
bodies representing larger constituencies. Power is not vested in any one individual, but in the
aggregate of the members who compose the body . . . .”). In ongoing litigation, a district court has
recognized that when the executive branch defies a congressional request for information, no personal
injury to legislators arises. See Cummings v. Murphy, 321 F. Supp. 3d 92, 108–09 (D.D.C. 2018)
(congressional plaintiffs suffered no personal injury when executive branch agency defied a request for
information made under a statute that applied specifically to legislators), appeal docketed, No. 18-5305
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 16, 2018).
143. If the House or Senate demanded information from an executive branch agency, a former
legislator might seek that same information through the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). See 5
U.S.C. § 552 (2018). But that Act vests rights in persons generally, not in members of Congress
specifically. See id. § 552(a)(6). Nothing in FOIA establishes that a former member of Congress can
access executive branch information by virtue of her former office. See id. § 552. That statute thus does
not establish any personal, private right to information for legislators or former legislators. It seemingly
establishes personal, private rights for everyone. How this statutory feature interacts with the injuryin-fact requirement remains unclear. See William Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 SUP.
CT. REV. 197, 203 (“[T]he Court has said in dictum that FOIA plaintiffs need show only ‘that they
sought and were denied specific agency records,’ and it continues to decide FOIA cases without
demanding any more.” (quoting Pub. Citizen v U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989))).
Compare John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1228 n.60
(1993) (“Under FOIA, every person is given a right of access to nonexempt government documents.
When an agency wrongfully denies an individual’s FOIA request, that particular individual has
suffered injury in fact under Article III and has standing to sue in federal court to redress that injury.”),
with Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. U. L.
REV. 169, 172 (2012) (“A plaintiff may seek enforcement of a valid FOIA request without having to
show any injury-in-fact at all.”).
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That same principle addresses the functional argument presented in
Committee on House Oversight & Government Reform v. Holder.144 In Holder, the
court emphasized that the judiciary was “routinely involved in the enforcement
of subpoenas.”145 Thus, an interbranch subpoena dispute presented “the sort of
question that the courts are traditionally called upon to resolve.”146 These
disputes were unlike those involving “matters of war and peace”147 and did not
bring politics “into a judicial forum.”148 Courts could competently resolve them.
The Holder court may have been correct that courts can often evaluate
congressional subpoenas without making highly sensitive or deeply political
judgments.149 But that does not address the theory behind the public trust
approach. Whether an institutional injury is concrete or vague, it is not personal.
Even if a subpoena presents a straightforward issue, Congress cannot establish
the injury-in-fact required to satisfy standing requirements.
Broad concerns about executive privilege also do not justify a subpoena
exception to the public trust approach. In Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers,150
the court observed that the judiciary defines the executive privilege, and that
congressional subpoenas may relate to allegedly privileged material.151 Thus,
courts could exercise jurisdiction over interbranch subpoena disputes: “The
judiciary must be available to resolve executive privilege claims.”152
Once again, the court’s statement may be true, but it does not address the
injury-in-fact concerns raised by the public trust approach. Courts may properly
determine whether the President enjoys executive privilege but only when the
plaintiff satisfies standing requirements. After all, courts do not define the
attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine outside of a case or
controversy.153 The Supreme Court has never suggested that Article III
requirements may be abandoned simply because executive privilege issues arise.
144. 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
145. Id. at 22.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d
34, 40 (D.D.C.1999)).
148. Id. at 24.
149. Whether a congressional subpoena threatens national security will depend on the facts. A
House subpoena requesting the names of all undercover U.S. intelligence operatives, for example, could
increase risks that their identities would be disclosed. See also AT&T II, 567 F.2d 121, 126–27 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (acknowledging the potential national security risks raised by a congressional subpoena, but
noting that concerns had been addressed “by bringing into sharper focus the needs of the parties”).
150. 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008).
151. Id. at 96.
152. Id.
153. The judiciary participates in promulgating the Federal Rules of Evidence and some other
federal procedural rules, but it does not define the rights of specific parties through that participation.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74 (2018). Thus, that participation does not reflect the exercise of the Article
III judicial power, and standing doctrine does not apply. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99
(1975).
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Courts have warned that if they do not enjoy jurisdiction over interbranch
subpoena disputes, Congress cannot adequately address executive branch
defiance.154 This claim seems highly questionable given the various ways that
Congress can exert pressure against the Executive.155 Also, congressional
subpoena lawsuits were unknown until the 1970s.156 Congress can resolve and
has resolved many informational disputes without going to court.157 Nonjudicial
remedies provide a potent check on the executive.158
Those remedies would be especially relevant if the executive branch defied
a court order to comply with a congressional subpoena. In those circumstances,
the House or Senate probably would not sit idle. Rather, they would withhold
appropriations, reject nominations, rebuff executive branch policies, impeach
and remove the President, or pursue other nonjudicial solutions.159 In other
words, they would pursue remedies already available when the executive branch
defies a congressional subpoena. The public trust approach thus does not leave
the legislature helpless to address executive branch defiance. It focuses the
House and Senate on unilateral remedies, rather than judicial ones.
III. CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS IN THE SUPREME COURT
The Court has never blessed Congress’s authority to sue the executive
branch, whether over a subpoena or otherwise. In Raines, discussed in Section
I.B, the Court partially relied on the public trust approach to foreclose lawsuits
154. In Miers, the court observed that the House could potentially detain the subpoenaed
witnesses, but it believed that doing so might precipitate a “constitutional crisis.” 558 F. Supp. 2d at
83. In McGahn, the court rejected the executive branch’s claim that “political checks” are “the sole
solution” to an interbranch subpoena dispute. Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d
148, 185 (D.D.C. 2019), vacated, 951 F.3d 510 (D.C. Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted sub nom. House
of Representatives v. Mnunchin, No. 19-1576, 2020 WL 1228477 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc); see also
Una Lee, Reinterpreting Raines: Legislator Standing To Enforce Congressional Subpoenas, 98 GEO. L.J. 1165,
1192 (2010) (“It would seem perverse to hold that Congress does not have standing to enforce a
subpoena against the Executive Branch in a civil suit because it has more extreme measures at its
disposal to remedy its injury . . . .”).
155. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 107.
157. See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text; see also Brand & Connelly, supra note 101, at
77 (“Congressional demands for information from the executive branch are nothing new. Indeed,
disputes between Congress and the President regarding the latter’s obligation to produce requested
information date back to the administration of George Washington.”).
158. See supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.
159. See Chafetz, supra note 101, at 1152–53 (describing congressional enforcement mechanisms
that do not require cooperation from another branch). Chafetz observes that the House can institute
impeachment proceedings against federal officers when the executive branch defies subpoenas, and that
the Senate can withhold confirmation votes for the President’s nominees. Id. at 1152. Either chamber
can also refuse to address legislative matters that the President cares about, or may even shut down the
entire federal government, by refusing to pass appropriations bills. See id. at 1152–53; see also Kucinich
v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding that, although a group of legislators lacked
standing to sue the President, they could use “political leverage” to reach a desired policy result “as
part of the give-and-take discussion and compromise envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution”).
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against the executive branch by individual legislators. Section III.A of this part
shows how the Court’s recent handling of a state interbranch dispute raises
questions over whether it will adopt the public trust approach for federal
subpoena disputes. Section III.B argues that structural considerations should
nonetheless lead the Court to embrace that approach.
A.

The Public Trust Approach in State-Level Disputes

Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission160
reveals the Court’s ambivalence to the public trust approach. That case arose
when the Arizona legislature sued a newly established independent state
commission.161 Through a ballot initiative, Arizona voters gave the state
commission the authority to draw congressional districts.162 But the Arizona
legislature believed that under the U.S. Constitution it held the indefeasible,
exclusive power to draw those districts.163 It also believed that it enjoyed
standing to assert its claims in federal court.164
The Court agreed with the legislature’s standing argument. Unlike Raines,
which had been brought by individual legislators, Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission involved “an institutional plaintiff asserting an
institutional injury.”165 The legislature’s power over districting issues had been
completely nullified through the newly established commission.166 This
institutional injury ensured that the controversy could “be resolved . . . in a
concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
consequences of judicial action.”167 The Court thus proceeded to the merits and
held against the legislature.168
The standing analysis in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission
contradicts the public trust approach. State legislators and legislatures, like their
federal counterparts, operate in representational capacities, as holders of public
160. 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
161. Id. at 2658–59.
162. Id. at 2658.
163. Id. at 2673 (“The Arizona Legislature maintains that . . . the Elections Clause renders the
State’s representative body the sole ‘component of state government authorized to prescribe . . .
regulations . . . for congressional redistricting.’” (quoting Brief for Appellant at 30, Ariz. State
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (No. 13-1314))). The
Elections Clause contemplates that Congress may alter how a state legislature regulates elections, but
the controversy in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission did not implicate that limitation. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”).
164. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at 2663–64.
165. Id. at 2664.
166. Id. at 2665.
167. Id. at 2665–66 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
168. Id. at 2677.
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trust.169 Yet the Court held that the Arizona legislature asserted a judicially
cognizable injury.
Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, objected to the majority’s approach. He
argued that the Article III judicial power, as understood in Marbury v.
Madison,170 included only the power to “decide on the rights of individuals.”171
He echoed many of the arguments made by Judge Bork in Barnes and by the
Court in Raines.
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission might imply that Congress has
standing to judicially enforce a subpoena in federal court. After all, if a state
legislature can sue the state executive branch for institutional injuries, why can’t
the federal legislature sue the federal executive branch for institutional injuries?
But, in a footnote, the Court cautioned that Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission did not “touch or concern the question whether Congress has
standing to bring a suit against the President.”172 For that question, “separationof-powers concerns” would arise.173
It is exquisitely unclear what the Court meant. The Court has already
grounded standing doctrine in separation-of-powers concerns,174 so its footnote
might add nothing new. Justice Scalia understandably doubted the distinction
offered by the Court, finding it implausible that “the Framers wanted federal
courts limited to traditional judicial cases only when they were pronouncing
upon the rights of Congress and the President, and not when they were treading
upon the powers of state legislatures and executives.”175
The Justices have continued to distinguish state interbranch disputes from
federal interbranch disputes. In Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill,176 the
169. See Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 125–26 (2011) (“[A] legislator’s vote
is the commitment of his apportioned share of the legislature’s power to the passage or defeat of a
particular proposal. The legislative power thus committed is not personal to the legislator but belongs
to the people; the legislator has no personal right to it.”).
170. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
171. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at 2694 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170).
172. Id. at 2665 n.12.
173. Id.
174. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (“The law of Article III standing,
which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used
to usurp the powers of the political branches.”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law
of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”).
175. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2695
(“What history and judicial tradition show is that courts do not resolve direct disputes between two
political branches of the same government regarding their respective powers.”).
176. 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019). In Bethune-Hill, twelve Virginia voters brought a federal lawsuit
against two state agencies and four election officials. Id. at 1949–50. The voters successfully argued, in
front of a three-judge federal district court, that some state legislative districts were redrawn in a way
that violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 1950. The Virginia
Attorney General subsequently announced that he would not appeal the adverse ruling. See id.
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Court held that a single house within Virginia’s bicameral legislature could not
appeal a federal decision that the Virginia Attorney General decided not to
contest.177 As in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Court used a
footnote to acknowledge the open issues related to federal interbranch
disputes.178 The dissenters in Bethune-Hill took a similarly cautious approach,
noting that an “interest asserted by a Member of Congress or by one or both
Houses of Congress that is inconsistent with [the federal constitutional]
structure may not be judicially cognizable.”179
The few words in Bethune-Hill do not shed light on the structural questions
concerning the Justices. However, the Justices may have been concerned about
unwarranted judicial supremacy.180 Suppose, for example, that the judiciary
immediately opined on actions taken by the executive and legislative branches.
In this scenario, the President might announce an executive order on one day
and a judge might quash it before any private party brought suit. Or, the House
might pass legislation and a court might immediately announce it
unconstitutional, rendering it dead on Senate arrival. In those cases, the public
probably would not view the judiciary as the “least dangerous” branch.181 Rather,
if courts umpired direct disputes between the branches or supervised their
internal affairs, our “system of checks and balances” would have been “replaced
by a system of judicial refereeship.”182
177. Id.
178. The majority said little about standing at the federal level, but it questioned the argument
that INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 929–31, 930–31 nn.5–6, 939–40 (1983), established that individual
houses within Congress can satisfy Article III standing requirements. See Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. at
1954 n.5 (specifying that, although Chadha referred to the United States House and Senate as parties
in the litigation, it was “far from clear” that the Court was referring to standing doctrine in doing so).
179. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting).
180. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408–09 (2013) (“Relaxation of standing
requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial power.” (quoting United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring))); see also Devins & Fitts, supra note 80,
at 361 n.54 (“Raines leaves little doubt that, for the Supreme Court, congressional standing is an
invitation to disaster, risking ‘public esteem’ by ‘plung[ing]’ the Court into bitter political battles.”
(quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 827, 829 (1997))).
181. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political
rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them.”); see also
Raines, 521 U.S. at 829 (explaining that it is a court’s role in protecting individual rights and “not some
amorphous general supervision of the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for
the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications
of judicial review” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.
166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring))).
182. Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 957, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); cf. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers,
17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 892 (1983) (“The degree to which the courts become converted into
political forums depends not merely upon what issues they are permitted to address, but also upon
when and at whose instance they are permitted to address them.”). In Raines, Justice Souter warned that
judicial intervention in an interbranch or intrabranch dispute “would risk damaging the public
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These concerns about judicial supremacy or legitimacy cannot alone
resolve whether Congress has standing to enforce its subpoenas. The Court has
been pulled into several major separation of powers battles and has decided
many contentious issues.183 To reject jurisdiction over federal interbranch
disputes, the Court should offer justifications beyond those related to public
perception.184
The public trust approach provides a strong, conceptually sound basis for
the Court to reject jurisdiction over congressionally initiated subpoena disputes.
If the Court embraces the public trust approach, however, it may have to
distinguish its holding in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. It is
unclear how the Court could justify a distinction if it examines standing issues
through the public trust lens. But, rightly or wrongly, the Court tolerates many
theoretical inconsistencies in standing doctrine.185 Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission probably thus does not pose a meaningful hurdle to
applying the public trust approach in the federal context.
B.

Structural Considerations

The case law on congressional subpoena disputes has focused mostly on
interpretive issues under Article III. However, Professors Grove and Devins
approach the issues through Article I of the Constitution.186 Under Article I,
the House and Senate each enjoy broad investigative powers.187 The authors
argue that to make those investigative powers effective, “each chamber must
confidence that is vital to the functioning of the Judicial Branch . . . by embroiling the federal courts
in a power contest nearly at the height of its political tension.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 833 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
183. When personal rights are at stake, the Court will address significant questions that divide the
branches. See, e.g., NLRB. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 556–57 (2014) (invalidating some executive
branch actions that relied on the President’s unconstitutional recess appointment); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (invalidating a statute establishing a legislative veto mechanism).
184. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013) (stating that when jurisdiction
exists, “a federal court’s ‘obligation’ to hear and decide a case is ‘virtually unflagging’” (quoting Colo.
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976))); Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“[The judiciary has] no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”).
185. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“We need not mince words when we say that the concept of ‘Art. III standing’
has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court.”); see
also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129–30 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[S]tanding [is] a word game
played by secret rules.”); Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability To Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV.
159, 171 (2011) (“At the most basic level, standing doctrine is confusing and unpredictable.”); Matthew
I. Hall, Making Sense of Legislative Standing, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2016) (“[T]he case law contains
various inconsistent pronouncements, rendering it difficult or impossible to discern a coherent doctrine
of legislative standing.”).
186. See Grove & Devins, supra note 140, at 574 (rejecting claims that Congress enjoys standing to
defend federal statutes but arguing that the House or the Senate can judicially enforce its subpoenas).
187. See id. at 574–75.
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have the authority to litigate any matters arising out of its investigations,
including by enforcing subpoenas” in the courts.188 They believe that this
litigation authority derives from the Rules of Proceedings Clause.189 Under that
clause, “[a] House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds,
expel a Member.”190
The Grove and Devins approach raises tensions with the case law.191 The
Court has traced congressional investigatory authority mainly to the legislative
power granted through the Vesting Clause.192 It has not referred to the Rules of
Proceedings Clause. Additionally, that clause addresses internal matters like
committee arrangements, voting procedures, and hearing schedules.193
Naturally read, it gives each house exclusive control over its own affairs.194 If
the Framers wanted to address external matters—for example, responsibility for
litigation in Article III courts—they presumably would have done so
elsewhere.195 The Rules of Proceedings Clause thus presents a questionable basis
for subpoena litigation authority.
Some may argue that the Impeachment Clauses establish Congress’s
authority to judicially enforce subpoenas.196 Under those clauses, the House
enjoys the “sole” power to impeach officers and the Senate enjoys the “sole”

188. Id. at 575; see also Grove, Standing and Fallacy, supra note 11, at 643 (“Each chamber’s standing
to enforce compliance with subpoenas can be justified as an extension of its inherent contempt
power.”).
189. Grove & Devins, supra note 140, at 574–75, 597–98 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 5, cl. 2).
190. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 5, cl. 2.
191. Others have expressed skepticism about congressional standing to enforce subpoenas. See, e.g.,
Chafetz, supra note 101, at 1154 (“[C]ourts have never offered a persuasive reason why a congressional
subpoena to an executive branch official is a matter of which the judiciary can properly take notice.”).
192. See supra Section II.A; see also, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Congress’s (Less) Limited Power To
Represent Itself in Court: A Comment on Grove and Devins, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 166, 180 (2014)
[hereinafter Beermann, Limited Power] (“[The investigatory power] is not derived from Congress’s
unicameral power to make its own rules and punish its members. Rather, it is derived from Congress’s
core legislative power.”).
193. Beermann, Limited Power, supra note 192, at 177 (highlighting that the Rules of the
Proceedings Clause “refers exclusively to internal congressional matters”).
194. See, e.g., Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 91 (1949) (“[The Court cannot] determine
the rules for either House of Congress nor require those rules to be expressed with any degree of
explicitness other than that chosen by the respective Houses.”).
195. But see Beermann, Limited Power, supra note 192, at 177 (suggesting that the Rules of the
Proceedings Clause may establish litigation authority for the House or Senate when that litigation
relates to internal matters, such as the expulsion of a member).
196. See Michael Stern, How Impeachment Proceedings Would Strengthen Congress’s Investigatory
Powers, JUST SECURITY (May 28, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64318/how-impeachmentproceedings-would-strengthen-congresss-investigatory-powers/
[https://perma.cc/4KP3-QXSB]
(“Courts would likely prefer to resolve information disputes between Congress and the administration
in the limited context of an impeachment inquiry (which would favor Congress), leaving broader
questions of congressional standing for the future.”).
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power to try them.197 Yet it seems awkward to read these clauses such that they
bless congressionally initiated lawsuits. The two clauses ensure that the House
and Senate enjoy an exclusive role in the impeachment and trial process,
respectively.198 Nothing in their language suggests that the Framers established
subpoena litigation authority through them.
The structural principles adopted in Buckley v. Valeo199 should overcome
any inferences drawn from the Rules of Proceedings Clause or the
Impeachment Clauses.200 In Buckley, the Court affirmed Congress’s
investigative authority under the Constitution.201 However, it distinguished
congressional investigative authority from congressional litigation authority.202
Federal litigation, the Court held, must be conducted by officers appointed
under the Constitution, not by legislators or their agents.203
Buckley did not directly involve litigation over congressional subpoenas.
Rather, the case arose through a constitutional challenge to the Federal Election
Commission (“FEC”).204 By statute, the FEC enjoyed broad investigation and
litigation authority over federal election law.205 But its eight members were not
selected through the Appointments Clause. Under that clause, only the
President, department heads, and courts may appoint officers.206 FEC members
were appointed with heavy congressional involvement.207

197. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (noting that the House of Representatives “shall have the
sole Power of Impeachment”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments.”).
198. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230–31 (1993) (discussing significance of “sole” in
Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 and explaining how that term established that, in impeachment trials, the
Senate could act “‘independently and without assistance or interference’” (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2168 (1971))).
199. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
200. Id. at 136–40.
201. Id. at 137–38.
202. Id. at 138.
203. Id. at 138–40.
204. See id. at 109 (describing the 1974 amendments to the Federal Elections Campaign Act of
1971 which created the FEC). Buckley also reached numerous significant holdings related to the First
Amendment and federal election law. See id. at 143.
205. See id. at 137. The FEC also enjoyed rulemaking authority. See id.
206. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Under the Appointments Clause, the President appoints
principal officers with the advice and consent of the Senate. See id. Inferior officers may also be
appointed by the President, unless Congress vests the power to appoint them in department heads or
in the courts of law. See id. In Buckley, no member had been appointed through these procedures. See
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113.
207. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 113. Under the relevant statute, four FEC members were appointed
by congressional leaders, two were appointed by the President (with the consent of the House and
Senate), and two congressional officers served as ex officio nonvoting members. See id.
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The Court held that the FEC appointment arrangement violated the
Constitution.208 Given their authority, FEC members “surely”209 qualified as
officers subject to the Appointments Clause. They exercised “significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”210 The FEC members were
thus invalidly appointed.211
The Court nonetheless held that the FEC could perform its investigative
functions. Those functions fell “in the same general category as those powers
which Congress might delegate to one of its own committees.”212 The Court had
long ago held that “the power of inquiry, with enforcing process, was regarded
and employed as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to
legislate.”213 The FEC could thus perform investigations—even if its members
were appointed by Congress.
But the FEC’s litigation authority could not survive. The “discretionary
power to seek judicial relief is authority that cannot possibly be regarded as
merely in aid of the legislative function of Congress.”214 Lawsuits provided the
“ultimate remedy for a breach of the law, and it is to the President, and not to
the Congress, that the Constitution entrusts the responsibility to ‘take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.’”215 Only properly appointed officers could
exercise litigation authority related to federal election law.216
Buckley strongly implies that Congress cannot judicially enforce
subpoenas. Lawsuits, “so far as the interests of the United States are concerned,
are subject to the direction, and within the control of, the Attorney-General.”217
Though Buckley expressly dealt with federal election investigations, its
208. Id. at 143.
209. Id. at 126. The Court did not resolve whether FEC members would qualify as principal
officers or instead as inferior officers. See id. (reasoning that the Commissioners “are at the very least
such ‘inferior Officers’ within the meaning of [the Appointments] Clause”). The resolution of that
distinction does not bear on this Article’s thesis.
210. Id. at 126.
211. See id. at 136 (“Not having the power of appointment, unless expressly granted or incidental
to its powers, the legislature cannot ingraft executive duties upon a legislative office, since that would
be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928))).
212. Id. at 137.
213. Id. at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135,
175 (1927)). The “enforcing process” discussed in McGrain relates to matters like contempt and
detention authority, rather than litigation authority. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175
(1927) (framing the issue presented as whether the House or Senate enjoyed authority, “through its
own process, to compel a private individual to appear before it or one of its committees and give
testimony needed to enable it efficiently to exercise a legislative function belonging to it under the
Constitution”).
214. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138.
215. Id. at 138 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
216. Id. at 140.
217. Id. at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454
(7 Wall), 458–59 (1869)).
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principles naturally extend to broader congressional inquiries. After all, the
Court in Buckley was plainly aware of congressional subpoena issues. When it
blessed the FEC’s investigative authority, the Court cited several major
congressional subpoena cases and even block-quoted one.218 Buckley thus follows
Reed v. County Commissioners219 in which the Court warned that a house of
Congress’s authority to conduct investigations did not establish its authority to
pursue lawsuits.220
The Buckley approach deserves special weight because it follows historical
practice.221 Litigation initiated by Congress, over a subpoena or otherwise, has
been unknown through most of our history. The executive branch has controlled
federal litigation from the time of our nation’s founding.222 Relatively recently,
Congress passed a statute authorizing the Senate to seek judicial enforcement
of some subpoenas.223 But that statute raises obvious tensions with Buckley’s
admonition that only properly appointed officers may exercise “significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”224
The Court’s decision in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.225
also creates tensions with Buckley, although not in a way that affects
218. Id. at 137–38 (quoting McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175).
219. 277 U.S. 376 (1928).
220. Id. at 389 (stating that the Senate’s authority to itself “compel production of evidence differs
widely from authority to invoke judicial power for that purpose”). Reed involved an unsuccessful
attempt by a Senate committee and its agent to judicially compel the disclosure of information from
some Pennsylvania county officials. See id. at 386–87. However, the Senate had not authorized the
lawsuit, and the Court dismissed the case without definitively addressing congressional authority to
initiate litigation. Id. at 389.
221. The weight that the Court gives to historical practice varies. However, in the context of
interbranch lawsuits, it has expressly relied on historical practice. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,
826–29 (1997).
222. For a useful historical discussion about the Attorney General and oversight of federal
litigation, see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 315 F. Supp. 3d 602, 612–17 (D.D.C. 2018) (describing
the establishment of the Attorney General under the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the later statutory
expansion of the Attorney General’s powers). In qui tam lawsuits, private parties have sometimes been
permitted to pursue litigation in the government’s name, but the Court has yet to address whether
those lawsuits comply with Article II. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000) (expressing “no view on the question whether qui tam suits violate Article II,
in particular the Appointments Clause of § 2 and the ‘take Care’ Clause of § 3”).
223. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 703, 705, 92 Stat. 1877–80
(1978) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b(b), 288d(a) (2018) and 28 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2018)).
Jurisdiction established under 28 U.S.C. § 1365(a) generally does not apply to controversies involving
a Senate subpoena directed towards the executive branch. The Senate has invoked the statute to
judicially enforce subpoenas against other parties. See GARVEY, ENFORCEMENT, supra note 97, at 22–
26. The Court has not yet addressed whether lawsuits that proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 1365 meet
standing requirements. The statute itself cannot lift those requirements. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 820 n.3
(“It is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the
right to sue to a plaintiff . . . .”). For all the reasons discussed in this Article, it is doubtful that the
Senate suffers a judicially cognizable harm for lawsuits under 28 U.S.C. § 1365.
224. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
225. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
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congressional subpoena litigation. In Young, the Court held that the judiciary
could appoint private attorneys to prosecute contempt of court actions.226 Those
prosecutions thus were not left to the sole discretion of the executive branch.227
However, the Court rejected any implied “congressional prosecutorial power”
to punish legislative contempt.228 If Congress could prosecute those who defied
it, the universe of potential defendants could be large.229 Given this potential, a
congressional prosecutorial power could “be wielded to eradicate fundamental
separation-of-powers boundaries.”230
Young, like Buckley, casts doubt on any direct congressional role in federal
litigation. Structural concerns thus do not undermine the public trust approach.
They support it. If the Court looks beyond the injury-in-fact requirement when
determining whether the House or Senate may judicially enforce a subpoena, it
should heed Buckley’s and Young’s lessons. The executive branch litigates; the
legislative branch legislates.231 Weak inferences from the Rules of Proceedings
Clause or the Impeachment Clauses do not alter this framework. If the
executive branch unlawfully defies a subpoena, Congress should seek redress
through nonjudicial remedies.232 Or a subsequent administration should initiate
prosecution.233 The Constitution does not contemplate congressional lawsuits
in this context. Congress suffers no injury-in-fact over a defied subpoena nor
may it conduct litigation on behalf of the United States.

226. Id. at 800–01. In Young, no statute granted courts the authority to appoint prosecutors for
contempt of court actions. See id. at 794 (noting that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b)
“assumes a pre-existing practice of private prosecution of contempts, but does not itself purport to serve
as authorization for that practice”). Thus, whether such appointments could be authorized under the
Appointments Clause was not at issue. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“Congress may by Law vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper . . . in the Courts of Law . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
227. Justice Scalia argued against any judicial appointment power in this context, emphasizing
separation of powers principles. Young, 481 U.S. at 815–25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 800 n.10 (majority opinion).
229. See id. (“[T]he court has jurisdiction in a contempt proceeding only over those particular
persons whose legal obligations result from their earlier participation in proceedings before the court.
By contrast, the congressional prosecutorial power the concurrence hypothesizes would admit of no
such limit; the parties potentially subject to such power would include the entire population.”).
230. Id.
231. For a contrary view, see Beermann, Limited Power, supra note 192, at 174–80 (acknowledging
the “powerful argument” presented in Buckley and related cases, but concluding that “Congress’s need
for information” overcomes the Appointments Clause concerns).
232. See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
233. Most federal crimes carry a five-year statute of limitations period. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)
(2018). This means that, absent presidential reelection, any officials who criminally defy a congressional
subpoena might face prosecution by a subsequent administration. If Congress wishes to extend the
statute of limitations such that it applies to executive branch officials who criminally defy a subpoena
during the first of a reelected President’s two terms, it should exercise its legislative power and do so.
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CONCLUSION
Standing doctrine probably does not immediately come to mind when one
hears the symposium title, Legal Ethics in the Age of Trump. But ethical
controversies related to the Trump Administration have raised issues well
beyond campaign finance laws, financial disclosure regulations, and so on. The
various House subpoena lawsuits have made justiciability issues directly
relevant to several ethical controversies.
Whether courts enjoy jurisdiction over congressional subpoena suits
presents an unsettled legal question. As this Article has shown, under the public
trust approach, the House or Senate would never enjoy standing to judicially
enforce a subpoena against the executive branch. Whether the Court will fully
embrace the public trust approach remains to be seen.
The open issues could have been resolved, and might still be resolved, in
a controversy that does not implicate President Trump. But the Trump
Administration has faced several significant subpoena lawsuits that call for
Court guidance. The executive branch and the legislative branch should each
know whether their informational battles must be waged in the judicial sphere
or the political sphere. The public trust approach, if adopted, would provide a
clear answer to that question.
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